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1 The publication of G. H. Mead’s Mind Self & Society. The Definitive Edition has been long
awaited by scholars and historians of  the thought of the philosopher and pragmatist
social psychologist. The editorial project of the University of Chicago Press followed this
Definitive Edition with the publication of The Timeliness of George Herbert Mead (2016), a
collection of the proceedings of the international conference held in April 2013 at the
University of Chicago, also edited by Hans Joas and Daniel Huebner and already reviewed
in this Journal (IX, 2, 2016). 
2 The re-edition of Mind,  Self  & Society is one of the most valuable achievements of the
collaboration of Huebner and Joas.  It  offers a fundamental  contribution to the ‘Mead
Renaissance’ unfolding in various disciplinary fields – from philosophy to psychology,
from  sociology  to  cognitive  sciences  –  behind  which  there  is  a  historiographic  and
theoretical intent to rehabilitate George H. Mead’s thought as one of the great classics of
American philosophical, psychological and sociological thought.
3 As is well known, Mind, Self & Society is Mead’s second posthumous volume. It is the work
of Morris’s impressive editorial work, which brings together “twelve sets of classroom
materials (stenographers’ transcripts, students’ notes, and students’ class papers)” of the
Advanced Social Psychology course held in 1928 and 1930 (with references in the notes
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also to Morris’s  notes taken during the course of  1924),  and “at least  eight different
manuscript fragments written by George H. Mead” (p. 391).
4 The new edition of 2015, with a foreword by Joas, presents also an appendix on Mead’s
sources thanks to rigorous work by Huebner. The appendix is, indeed, the real treasure of
this new edition, the text of which, with the numbering of the pages, remains the same as
the  1934  edition,  with  some  correction  of  misprints  included  in  the  first  edition.
Huebner’s  reconstruction  offers  an  insight  into  Morris’s  editorial  work,  which  is
noteworthy, given that it is thanks to him that Mead’s thought has become known to
most;  but  in  some  respects,  Morris  misguides  us  by  introducing  questionable
interpretative canons to the reader in a way that is perhaps too invasive. The critical
analysis of sources such as that carried out by Huebner allows us to remodel and relocate
this work of Mead within an overall assessment of his production.
5 The  first  and  most  obvious  example  of  Morris’s  editorial  invasiveness  that  Huebner
highlights  is  the  definition  of  ‘social  behaviorist’  that  in  the  first  chapter  Morris
attributes to Mead. As Huebner notes, at many points of the first chapter of Mind, Self &
Society, “the wording of the source material has been modified so as to draw a sharper
distinction  between  Mead’s  meaning  of  the  term  ‘behaviorism’  and  a  ‘narrow,’  or
Watsonian, understanding of the term” (397). So intrusive is Morris’s ‘editing’ that at the
end  of  the  ninth  paragraph  he  adds  the  sentence  “Our  behaviorism  is  a  social
behaviorism,” just as he adds all the occurrences of the expression ‘social behaviorism’
present in the volume. As is well known, Mead had clearly distinguished his position from
Watson’s since the 1920s. He repeatedly stressed the importance of the use of behavioral
psychology for the understanding of the mental processes of the human being. However,
he also specified that the observation of behavior should be considered as one of the
methods  of  psychology,  not  the only  one:  it  is  inevitable  to  take the observation of
behavior as a starting point, but one cannot a-priori deny consciousness because there is
no agreement on the meaning of this term. As this passage from the appendix explains:
“To account for them [i.e., mind or consciousness] thus is not to reduce them to the status
of non-mental psychological phenomena, as Watson supposes – is not to show that they
are not really mental at all;  but is simply to show that they are a particular type of
behavioristic phenomena, or one type of behavioristic phenomena among others” (399).
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in a lecture on behaviorism in Movements of Thought
in the Nineteenth Century,  one of a series that Mead delivered in 1928 and which were
subsequently edited into book form by Merritt H. Moore in 1936, he distinguished two
perspectives from which to consider the notion of ‘behavior’: the Watsonian perspective,
according to which the process of the organism is seen from an external point of view;
and the Deweyan perspective, which also includes in human behavior the different values
associated with the notion of ‘consciousness.’  In particular,  the Deweyan perspective,
which interprets consciousness in functional terms as an experience of the interaction of
the  individual  with  the  physical  and social  environment,  allows  us  to  overcome the
reductionist  pattern of  stimulus-response  –  an echo of  the  ancient  dualism between
sensation  and  idea  –  and  to  consider  human  conduct  as  the  active  product  of  the
inhibition of actions initially correlated to physiological impulses.
6 Other important points that Huebner reports include Mead’s reference to Darwin which
has been omitted from the chapter “The Behavioristic Significance of Gestures,” and a
reformulation of the explanation of emotion in the fourth chapter, as well as a passage
concerning  the  physiology  of  attention  (404).  Related  to  this  last  topic  is  a  very
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interesting  formulation  of  the  problems  of  parallelism omitted  from the  chapter  on
“Parallelism and the Ambiguity of ‘Consciousness’.” Here Mead states: “If we are going to
restrict the field of consciousness to that which psychology deals with we have left an
organism which is stated in physical, or if you like in physiological, terms and the rest of
the field of our experiences is brought within the range of so-called consciousness. This
content,  however,  is  one which we cannot completely bring within the range of  our
psychological investigation. We can’t get it completely out of the field of physiological
science” (406). Mead then continues by highlighting the ambiguity with which parallelism
considers consciousness: “If we are to be quite consistent in it we have to regard the
physiological system simply as a group of electrons and neurons and take out of it all the
meanings that attached to them as specific physiological objects and lodge them in a
consciousness. We find difficulty even with that. But supposing we did, we could not have
the sort of physiological organisms which the physiologist implies as a counterpart of the
psychological process. We could get all of consciousness on one side and on the other side
a purely physical organism that has no content of consciousness at all” (407).
7 In a further passage omitted from chapter thirty on “The basis of human society: man and
insects,” Mead resumes the theory of the importance of the human hand that will then
play an even more important role in the perceptual theory found in The Philosophy of the
Act (1938): “A beefsteak, an apple, is a thing. It may be the stimulus which sets the process
going, but it is a thing. There is a category under which you can bring all these stimuli
which are qualitatively different but they are all things. The hand, with the erect posture
of the human animal, is something in which he comes in contact, something by which he
grasps. […] It is that utilization of the hand within the act which has given to the human
animal his world of physical things” (462).
8 Other interesting aspects concern the complex nuances Mead places on the distinction
between ‘I’ and ‘Me’ and on the partially unpredictable character of the ‘I’ with respect to
‘Me’ (455), as well as on the relationship between self and the situational context (472).
Moreover, the ambiguity highlighted by Huebner in the use of the expressions ‘universal
discourse’ and ‘universe of discourse’ (451-2) is particularly evident. Concerning this and
other points, Huebner notes how difficult it is to determine how much Mead contributed
to their formulation. It is quite clear, in fact, that the stenographer has misunderstood or
mis-transcribed certain points and Morris’s hand has added ambiguity to ambiguity with
the intention of correcting them.
9 In addition to highlighting Morris’s heavy editorial  work,  the additional explanations
Mead provided following the questions the students asked him, in which he offered “a
unique standpoint on Mead’s teachings” (392), are useful for orientation in Mead’s work.
Worthy  of  note,  for  example,  is  the  additional  discussion  Mead  offers  about  the
mechanism of language learning and the contrast between language learning in humans
and birds: “The vocalizing which the individual makes in their beginning of the phonetic
process  are  in a  great  many respects  identical  with those which it  hears.  There are
emphasized, they are the ones that come back, select and repeat themselves. Here we
have a mechanism out of which the significant symbol arises. You couldn’t call, of course,
the vocalization which you get in the parrot, under such conditions, significant symbols.
They have no meaning to the parrot such as they have in human society. They do not
enter into the process which these vocalizations mediate in the human society, but the
mechanics of it is the same” (416). 
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10 Worth noting is also the answer, linked to this discussion, to a question not included in
the published text, concerning the responses to stimuli, in which Mead argues that some
vocal elements that have emotional reactions evoke the same responses in the person
who emits it as in the person who receives it (416). Or again, the answer he offers to the
following question: “Can an individual be conscious of an object without responding to
it?” omitted from chapter 22 on “The ‘I’ and the ‘Me’.” Mead responds to the question by
highlighting the need to clarify the meaning of consciousness: “As I have said the term
‘conscious’ is ambiguous, we use it sometimes when we simply mean the presence of the
object in our experience and also where we have a definite conscious relation” (445). It
depends on the type of responses to certain stimuli:  certain responses are present in
attitudes, and they are beginnings of reactions, responses to an object that are included
in our experience. In this sense, there is consciousness of the object. To this explanation
is linked the question: “Wouldn’t you think we have a consciousness of physical self as
well as a social self?,” to which Mead answers that: “under ordinary circumstances we
don’t distinguish between our physical self and the social self. It is the physical self which
is the social self. It is the self which has such and such expression, wears such and such
clothes. That is the social self, because those go to make up the characters that call out
the social responses” (446).
11 In the appendix to the text it is also possible to find many bibliographical references
Mead used in his lectures. For example, in Mead’s explanation of multiple personalities in
the chapter on the constitution of the self (ch. 18, ¶ 11), the references to Morton Prince’s
The Dissociation of a Personality (1905) and The Unconscious (1914) are made explicit.
12 We cannot report here all the interesting details that, thanks to Huebner’s work, become
salient  in  Mead’s  volume.  What  must  be reiterated is  that  the re-edition of  such an
important  work in the philosophical,  sociological  and psychological  panorama of  the
twentieth century offers an essential contribution to various disciplines that are now
undergoing rapid change. As Joas states in the Foreword of this new edition, in “an age of
rapid advances in cognitive and evolutionary psychology and of enormous public interest
in a new ‘naturalism,’ Mead’s ideas deserve greatest attention” (xii). Mead, in fact, is an
author who can still offer a significant contribution to the development of the different
socio-psychological disciplines. The recognition of the primary sources of the text and
the  precise  identification  of  the  editorial  work  make  this  new  edition  the  point  of
reference for any scholar who wants to approach the work of Mead, and want to draw
from it some crucial insights and critical reflections.
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